here in the past.
I asked Jenna if she could create a logo for our Secure Data Environment (SDE), and above you can see the one that I liked best. I leave it as an exercise to the reader to decide if the terrified individual in the picture is a defeated intruder or a frustrated ICPSR data curator.
The blog contains several posts that go into some detail about the software and security components behind the SDE, but I'm not sure that I ever posted a high-level description to set context, scope, and purpose. And so along with Jenna's logo, I present the story behind the SDE.
The ICPSR Secure Data Environment (SDE) is a protected work area that uses technology and process to protect sensitive social science research data from accidental or deliberate disclosure. The SDE exploits commonly used security technologies such as firewalls, ActiveDirectory group policies, and network segmentation to minimize unwanted access between the SDE and outside world. Further, it takes advantage of work processes which require strict control of when data may be moved between the SDE and external locations.
Data enter the SDE through ICPSR's deposit system. Depositors upload their content to a web application on our public web portal where it is encrypted. An automated process "sweeps" content from the portal several times per hour, moving it to the SDE, where it is then unencrypted. The content resides on a special-purpose EMC Network Attached Storage (NAS) appliance which services ICPSR's SDE. The appliance uses private IP address space which is only routed within the University of Michigan enterprise network, and is also protected by a firewall. Further, NAS shares are exported only to specific machines and only to specific ActiveDirectory groups.
ICPSR data managers must be located on the University of Michigan enterprise network to access the SDE. (They may use the University of Michigan VPN client to access the network from remote locations, and this requires strong authentication and implements strong encryption.) Data managers run a simple utility to "log in" to the SDE. Once logged into the SDE they are assigned to a disposable virtual Windows 7 desktop system which is configured to persist any content on the ICPSR SDE NAS. Any content stored on the virtual desktop system is destroyed once the image is terminated.
Data curators are not allowed to access the Internet or email within the SDE, and they do not have access to local system ports (e.g., USB). Clipboards are NOT shared between the SDE and the local machine, and so there is no ability to "cut and paste" between the two environments. It is possible, of course, for data curators to take notes from what they see on the screen, and to take screen snapshots, but ICPSR management considers these to be acceptable risks.
Data curators may release data from the SDE via two mechanisms.
One, they may submit completed work for release via an internal work system called turnover. This queues material for placement in archival storage, and also queues related material for release on the web site. A release manager reviews all content before allowing it on the web site.
Two, they may submit unfinished work for transfer outside of the SDE. In this case a request appears in the inbox of the data curator's supervisor who may then review the request, and then accept or reject it. If accepted the content is available to the data curator through a simple file retrieval mechanism, and the transfer is logged.
ICPSR has contracted the services of a "white hat" ethical hacker to assess the security vulnerabilities on the SDE. ICPSR has already implemented small changes within the SDE based on preliminary reports from the contractor.